For all of these reasons, it came as something of a surprise when, in March the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Natalegawa, stated that Egypt had requested assistance from Indonesia in organizing democratic elections and regulations related to political parties. These activities notwithstanding, it was the Turkish democratic model that received much more favorable attention in the region than did the Indonesian one in the immediate aftermath of the uprisings, as reflected in the emerging new democratic discourse of the Arab World.
The idea that Tunisia, which had sparked the Arab Spring, might be a suitable candidate for this model  gained some currency, including in Tunisia itself. When Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa first revealed the Egyptian request for democracy support, he noted that Tunisia had also sought similar assistance.
Although there is significant variation in funding levels between European states, they remain some of the biggest funders of democracy around the world. The people in Egypt wanted to have a democratic rule in order to have solutions to the social inequality, favoritism, and corruption. By comparison, in the realm of security, the EEAS consists of over fourteen divisions not including EU military staff. Myanmar has a long history of persecuting the Rohingya, a mostly Muslim community of more than a million people living in western Rakhine State. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers cambridge. To stay in the game, the EU needs a new strategy. Economics is not a silver bullet.
Since the cooperation on democracy between Indonesia and post-Arab Spring countries has been limited to Tunisia. Accordingly, Indonesia decided to establish in Tunisia a chapter of the B. F, that will enable scholars, politicians and academics from both countries as well as from other Middle Eastern countries to discuss ways to reinforce good governance, tolerance and peaceful coexistence.
It also seems that this increasing cooperation on democracy, including the promotion of interfaith dialogue and religious harmony, has given a boost to the overall bilateral relationship. Certainly, one cannot ignore differences between the Indonesian and the Tunisian contexts in which the democratization process has unfolded.
Clearly, an important building block for this cooperation has been the crucial role played by civil society, which was robust in Tunisia even before the outbreak of the Arab Spring and strong in Indonesia as well.
In fact, the shared consensus on, and commitment to a civic state, rather than a religious one, enabled an effective civic resistance movement, successful non-violent transition to democracy and the ability to surmount political crisis and to translate collective will into a democratic action in Tunisia. Perhaps in absolute terms, cooperation on democracy between Indonesia and Tunisia is rather modest.
However, in relative terms, taking a wider view of the region in the post-Arab Spring period and in the context of the centuries-old asymmetrical relations between Arab-speaking lands and Indonesia with respect to the transferring of ideas, such cooperation is very impressive cooperation.
And there are additional interesting historical insights. For centuries, Tunisia likewise lay on the periphery of the Muslim World — i.
At that time, Indonesia was then an inspiring example for Tunisians waging an ultimately successful anti-colonial struggle for independence. And lately, as Tunisia has embarked on a transition to democracy, it has again found Indonesia to be as inspirational example. Marty M.
In the aftermath of the Tunisian Revolution , young Egyptians spread the call to protest online with the help of a Facebook campaign, "We Are All Khaled Said," organized by the April 6 Youth Movement , Egypt's "largest and most active online human-right activist group.
Social networks were not the only instruments available for rebels to communicate their efforts. In countries with the lowest Internet penetration and limited social networks, such as Yemen and Libya, mainstream electronic media devices like cell phones, emails, and video clips e.
YouTube were used to cast light on the country's situation. Some argue that the constant live coverage by Al Jazeera and other news agencies during the Egyptian Revolution of prevented mass violence by the Egyptian government in Tahrir Square , as the cameras streamed the events to the outside world. When the internet was cut off throughout Egypt, protesters went to the poor area of Cairo and recruited citizens there because they are facing the worst in the regime. According to some experts, the initial excitement over the role of social media in political processes in the countries of the Maghreb and the Middle East has diminished.
Instead, social media acted as a catalyst for revolution, as in the case of Egypt, where the existing gap between the ruling elite and the rest of the population would eventually have resulted in some kind of uprising. A literature review conducted by Robert Zepic et al. In addition to demonstrators, autocratic governments themselves also use social media for their purposes, for example, to monitor citizens.
Terrorist groups are also increasingly making use of social media, using the medium to recruit new followers or spread propaganda. In his article "Small Change.
Why the revolution will not be tweeted," Malcolm Gladwell outlines two main reasons why social media cannot be considered as a factor of real social change. First, social media leads to low-risk activism based on weak ties among participants, meaning that users can create the feeling of political action while not actually achieving anything.
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